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Fiduciary law is expanding throughout the world. Fiduciary law aims at encouraging 
fiduciary relationships, which are beneficial to society. Increasing globalization has increased the need 
for fiduciary law. Consequently, fiduciary law has spread in both common law and civil law 
jurisdictions, leading to a need for a unified approach, which would provide many advantages. The 
two systems share the same goals but achieve them through different means. International fiduciary 
standards and self-regulation may be helpful in promoting trust to encourage use of fiduciary services. 
The impact of fiduciary law is predicted to increase because of the increasing importance of trust and 
trust relationships and increasing interdependence of nations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fiduciary law is expanding throughout the world.1 It seems to be a new 
phenomenon, but in reality, it is not. Fiduciary law is ancient. It existed centuries ago 
in Mesopotamia,2 Rome,3 Egypt,4 Greece,5 as well as in Jewish6 and Christian laws.7 
 
1 See, e.g., Lei No. 6.404 § 5, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, DÍARIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.12.1976 (Braz.) (recognizing fiduciary duties that are owed to an array of stakeholders 
by corporate officers); Directive 2014/65/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU (requiring member counties to adopt rules regarding the honesty, fairness, and 
professionalism of investment services providers as well as the requirement of acting in accordance 
with the best interest of their clients); see also J. Mark Ramseyer & Masayuki Tamaruya, Fiduciary 
Principles in Japanese Law, 19 (Harv. Publ. L., Working Paper No. 17-49, 2017), reprinted in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=3044758  (discussing Japanese fiduciary principles in detail as well as “guardianship trusts,” which 
are developed in line with demographic needs specific to Japan to limit the misappropriation of assets 
owned by the elderly). 
2 See Russ VerSteeg, Early Mesopotamian Commercial Law, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 183, 196–202 
(1999) (explaining Hammurabi’s laws of agency and bailment that imposed fiduciary-like responsib- 
ilities on the agent and bailee). 
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Fiduciary duties arguably developed later in Great Britain when master landlords left 
for the holy land on religious crusades and had to rely on others to manage their 
estates.8 The ancient rules, such as those found in agency law in Mesopotamia, may 
not have been as sophisticated as the current ones—such as stewardship codes9 and 
the consideration of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors10—for 
measuring financial performance. But the fundamental problems and solutions in 
each system have remained the same. These problems continue in the recent global 
movement, which developed these principles and guides of behavior.  
 
3 See Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1356–61 
(2006) (discussing the commercial forms of organizations); Mary Szto, Limited Liability Company 
Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 89 (2004) (emphasizing the 
relationship between fiduciary laws and laws of property and inheritance); see generally DAVID 
JOHNSTON, THE ROMAN LAW OF TRUSTS (1988) (examining the development of the fideicommissa 
(trusts) in Roman law, which had considerable influence on the 22 Common Law development of 
trusts). 
4 See, e.g., Joshua J. Mark, Ancient Egyptian Law, ANCIENT HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oct. 2, 
2017), https://www.ancient.eu/Egyptian_Law/ (explaining a legally enforceable agency-like 
relationship in which family members hired replacements known as ka-priests to fulfill the family’s 
obligation to provide daily food and drink offerings for their deceased’s tomb on their behalf). 
5 STEVEN JOHNSTONE, A HISTORY OF TRUST IN ANCIENT GREECE 9 (2011) (“[M]any Greek 
marketplace regulations, usually understood as attempts to control prices, seem equally aimed at 
overcoming or at least compensating for the asymmetric positions of sellers and buyers and at 
restraining or eliminating haggling, which is the manifestation of this asymmetry.”). 
6 See Israel Herbert Levinthal, The Jewish Law of Agency, 13 JEWISH Q. REV. (n.s.) 117, 124 
(1922) (explaining the Jewish law of agency); Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Socially Responsible 
Corporate Conduct, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 681, 691 (2006) (discussing the characterization of 
corporate shareholders as partners). 
7 Szto, supra note 4, at 88. (“In Christian theology, Christ is the perfect fiduciary.”). 
8 See GARY WATT, TRUSTS AND EQUITY 9 (8th ed. 2018); see generally David J. Seipp, Trust and 
Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1014–16 (exploring the roots of trust and 
fiduciary duties in Anglo-American common law). 
9 The stewardship movement, pioneered by the United Kingdom in 2010, has been followed 
by many countries and global institutional investors including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. Ernst & Young, Q&A on 
Stewardship Codes 4 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-stewardship-
codes-august-2017/$FILE/ey-stewardship-codes-august-2017.pdf. Generally, stewardship codes 
encourage institutional investors with long-term mandates to engage with the management of their 
portfolio companies to discharge their fiduciary duties owed to beneficiaries. This engagement helps 
reduce the gap between the ultimate beneficiary and managers as well as the potential for 
misalignment of interests. David Walker, A Review Of Corporate Governance In UK Banks And Other 
Financial Industry Entities: Final Recommendations § 5 (2009), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
+/http:/www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf. Stewardship activities may include 
monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital 
structure, and corporate governance, including culture and remuneration. 
10 The recent paradigm shift measures corporate success in the long-run, paying attention to 
how it was achieved. Institutional investors are increasingly being required to make sustainability 
assessments of the portfolio assets in regards to environmental, social, and governance aspects (ESG) 
to measure future financial performance. Furthermore, investment portfolios that do not take ESG 
factors into account are a potential breach of fiduciary duty because they may expose the beneficiaries 
to legal, regulatory, geopolitical, and reputational risks. INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN 
GUIDANCE, IMPLICATIONS OF FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: A GLOBAL OVER 
VIEW  OF INVESTOR  DUTIES  AND RESPONSIBILITIES 11 (2018), https://www.icgn.org/sites/defa 
ult/files/Item_5_ICGN%20Fiduciary%20Duty%20Guidance-Final2015May25.pdf. 
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What caused the rise of this global movement? Human nature offers a partial 
answer. Unlike many types of animals, whose survival depends on the support of 
other members, cooperation in human societies is generally volitional rather than 
based on genetics.11 Human beings have sought and found ways not only to live with 
each other, but also to specialize and to help others as well as themselves. Yet, with 
these benefits came problems of dependence and unequal power in relationships. 
Fiduciary law helps resolve such problems and encourages these relationships. When 
people of different countries and cultures interact, fiduciary law is doubly valuable. It 
provides a foundation for trust, without which long-term and profitable relationships 
cannot exist.  
Part one of this article describes the main problems found in fiduciary 
relationships—that is, the types of problems fiduciary law is designed to solve. Part 
two offers a short description of globalization: the rising interaction among people in 
different parts of the globe. Part three discusses the current growth of problems 
involving fiduciary relationships in the global context. Part four describes the 
difficulties of integrating fiduciary law into different legal systems and different 
cultures, and part five focuses on the ways in which fiduciary rules could more easily 
be applied to fiduciaries and their relationships with others.  
This Article concludes with a prediction that fiduciary principles and their 
enforcement will likely regulate a significant part of international relationships. This 
prediction, however, is a hopeful one. Hopefully, the restrictions on powerful 
fiduciaries will not be excessive and the benefits of their self-limitations will enrich all 
parties in societies around the globe. 
     
I. PART ONE: THE PROBLEMS THAT FIDUCIARY LAW IS DESIGNED TO SOLVE 
The main problems that fiduciary law addresses are as follows:  
First, most fiduciaries offer services—such as health care, legal services, 
teaching, asset management, financial advice, and corporate management—that are 
socially desirable and often require expertise. Usually, this level of expertise cannot 
be easily or quickly acquired. To be sure, some fiduciary services can be offered by 
machines. Yet, even then, building, developing and using the machines would require 
expert services, which themselves might lead to fiduciary relationships. 
Second, in order to perform these services effectively, fiduciaries must be 
entrusted with property or power. For example, brokerage and asset management 
cannot be performed without vested powers and control over the managed assets. 
We name the owners of the assets “entrustors.” 
Third, entrustment poses the risk that fiduciaries may abuse their entrusted 
power by failing to perform the promised services adequately. They may perform the 
services negligently and thereby cause entrustors harm, or they may misappropriate 
entrusted property, or entrusted power, for the benefit of someone other than the 
entrustor. In fiduciary relationships, there is a likelihood that entrustors will be 
 
11 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 259 
(1992) (“Now we may need to emphasize our difference as flexible animals with a vast range of 
potential behavior. Our biological nature does not stand in the way of social reform.”); see also Tamar 
Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law, 4–5 (B. U. Sch. of L., Public Law Research Paper No. 18-18, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237023 (explaining the role of fiduciary duties in human societies, in 
which cooperative behavior is not linked as tightly to genes). 
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unable to protect themselves from these risks. The markets may also fail to protect 
entrustors. Further, the costs of establishing trustworthiness may be higher than the 
benefits a fiduciary receives from the relationship.12 Unless the law intervenes to 
protect the interests of society in providing these services by meeting the needs of 
both parties, it is unlikely that the parties will choose to interact.13 In other words, as 
economists might say, the costs of the relationship to both parties need to be 
reduced.14 
Thus, fiduciary law aims at encouraging dependent relationships by reducing 
the burdens of the parties’ self-protection on one hand, and trust-insurance on the 
other hand, thus inducing them to interact. Differently stated, fiduciary law consists 
of a society’s rules that help maintain trust by dependent members when trust is 
desirable and when verification of trustworthiness of others is costly. 
Fiduciary law aims at reducing the entrustors’ risks of their fiduciaries’ 
violations of expectations in two main areas.15 First, there is a risk of 
misappropriation of the entrusted property or power by the fiduciaries. Second, 
entrustors may suffer losses because of the faulty performance of the fiduciaries’ 
services, which, as noted earlier, are usually expert services and often hard to evaluate 
by non-experts.16 These risks are precisely what entrustors are encouraged to take.17 
Therefore, fiduciary duties are focused on the assumptions about an entrustor’s 
ability to protect himself as well as his ability to provide alternative means of 
protections that entrustors can enjoy.18 In sum, fiduciary law establishes a duty of 
care, ensuring the quality of expert services and a duty of loyalty prohibiting 
conflicting interests, which undermine trust. 
The combined duties of care and loyalty are similar to the so-called Golden 
Rule, which has historically attracted supporters from different cultural 
backgrounds.19 The Golden Rule acknowledges an essential moral principle based on 
the ethics of reciprocity: one should treat others in a manner that he or she would 
like to be treated.20 The Rule requires everyone to “[a]ct in his relations with others 
on the same standards or principles that he would have them apply in their treatment 
of him, taking account of and respecting, but not necessarily acceding to, their 
wishes and desires.”21 Consequently, one should identify with another to exercise 
 
12 TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 6 (2011). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 




19 The history of the Golden Rule extends to Homer’s Odyssey (800 B.C.E.), the writings of 
Confucius (551–479 B.C.E.), the Babylonian legend of Ahikar (500 B.C.E.), and it resonates in the 
maxims of prophets, philosophers and common understandings of religious leaders. See JEFFREY 
WATTLES, THE GOLDEN RULE 15 (1996). 
20 PARLIAMENT OF THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS, DECLARATION TOWARD A GLOBAL ETHIC 2 
(1993), https://parliamentofreligions.org/pwr_resources/_includes/FCKcontent/File/TowardsAGlo 
balEthic.pdf (“We must treat others as we wish others to treat us.”). 
21 Marcus G. Singer, The Golden Rule, 38 PHILOSOPHY 293, 313 (1963). 
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reasonable care and avoid conflicts of interest in his or her dealings.22 Similar to 
fiduciary law, this rule cultivates trust among individuals.  
The assurance of trust in others is not merely “good.” It is crucial to the 
existence of profitable human societies. We depend on each other from birth to 
death. Yet, if that is so, why do we need the law? Arguably, the fiduciary concept 
plays a similar role to the genetic preference for cooperation that is seen in most 
animals.23 However, the discussion in this article is limited to the current spread of 
fiduciary rules as law around the globe. The subject-law varies, but the applicability of 
fiduciary principles to the law’s foundation and objectives is the same whenever and 
wherever it is applied.  
In sum, regardless of their cultural and historical background, societies have 
adopted fiduciary rules or similar initiatives to resolve the issues arising from human 
behavior. Traits such as trust, cooperation, and loyalty are a result of a complex 
neurological and biochemical process that develops continuously, based on a 
continually updating dataset obtained from our interactions with other humans.24 
Although externalities such as personal experience may vary between individuals, the 
decision-making process is organic, and essentially similar.25 
 
II. PART TWO: GLOBALIZATION 
In the twentieth century, technology facilitated a new wave of globalization.26 
Technological developments (e.g., commercial civil aviation, rise of productivity in 
merchant marines, use of the telephone as the main mode of communication) 
enabled the worldwide expansion of trade after the Second World War because they 
resulted in reduced transaction costs.27 
Technology brought people in distant places closer together. The digitization 
of traditional forms of communication such as mail and telephone facilitated 
 
22 Essentially the word “identity” implies separateness. Every individual has an identity that 
distinguishes one from another. The word “identify”, among other definitions, means to “recognize” 
and “associate.” It means empathy, the capacity to imagine how others feel, even though they are 
different from us. Therefore, one who identifies with another avoids doing harm from which he or 
she will also suffer. 
23 FRANKEL, supra note 13, at 4. 
24 A recent study investigating the underlying decision-making mechanisms through iterated 
trust games, in which the participants were required to choose between investing with a friend, 
confederate, or computer, posits that one’s decisions are affected by his or her learning of the 
partner’s reputation and that the participant’s expectations are updated based on the experienced 
outcomes. A second hypothesis is that reciprocated trust triggers a reward signal that drives future 
collaborative decisions. Dominic S. Fareri et al., Computational Substrates of Social Value in Interpersonal 
Collaboration, 35(21) J. OF NEUROSCI. 8170, 8176 (2015). 
25 In another experiment, the participant had to choose an amount of money to send to a 
stranger via computer, knowing that the money would triple in amount if the recipient cooperated and 
understanding that the recipient could keep all the cash. As a result, the more money people received 
(denoting greater trust on the part of senders), the more oxytocin hormone their brains produced. 
The amount of oxytocin found in the blood circulation of the recipients predicted how trustworthy 
(their likelihood of sharing the money) they would be. The study also found that oxytocin increased a 
person’s empathy, which is underscored as a “useful trait for social creatures trying to work together.” 
Paul J. Zak, The Neuroscience of Trust, HARV. BUS. REV., 3, 84 (2017). 
26 Esteban Ortiz-Ospina et al., Trade and Globalization, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2014),  
https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization. 
27 Id. 
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interaction between greater distances. This increased trade and the exchange of 
knowledge, ideas, opinions, and it satisfied our curiosity. All these changes raised the 
foundational issue of trust to the forefront because each enriching exchange also has 
the potential to be devastatingly harmful if it was untrustworthy and fraudulent.  
Previously, in the nineteenth century, international travel and trade were 
mainly driven by colonialism.28 Together with colonial activities, fiduciary relations 
spread from England to its colonies throughout the world, resulting in London’s 
prominence in the international capital market. The path of fiduciary relationships 
diverged into two routes: one route went around the Cape of Good Hope toward the 
east, through South Africa, India, and then to Japan. The other path went west 
crossing North America and the Pacific Ocean, to reach Japan in the early twentieth 
century.29  
Today the trend continues, driving the “integration of national economies 
into a global economic system,”30 increasing the volume of international trade and 
the number of preferential trade agreements. This is globalization. This process has 
produced a remarkable growth in trade between countries,31 and has facilitated 
migration and diverse geographical pathways, causing changes in societal structures 
and affecting legal developments. 
 
III. PART THREE: THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY LAW IN GLOBAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Technology may be the short explanation for the growth of global fiduciary 
rules. Yet it is more complex than that. Technology has fueled global interaction, 
which has led to increasing volumes of international trade, e-commerce, and the 
need for expert services. This increased interaction has also resulted in a growing 
trust-gap, which fiduciary laws are attempting to fill. Another reason for the 
expansion of fiduciary rules may be the efforts to limit the power of corporate 
directors and financial managers, which has become more prevalent since the 
revelation of major scandals and global financial crises.  
 
A. The world needs more trustworthy parties and experts because international trade and 
expertise are expanding. 
Today's global economic system is based on an “intricate network of 
economic interactions” throughout the entire world.32 “[C]ountries exchange not 
only final products, but also intermediate inputs,” and services, such as tourism, 
financial services, and legal advice, which are intangible commodities.33 The 
international exchange of expert services is fairly new compared to the trade of 
tangible goods,34 however, this trend is likely to increase in the near future. 
Companies that traditionally developed products are progressively building 
 
28 Id. 
29 Masayuki Tamaruya, Japanese Law and the Global Diffusion of Trust and Fiduciary Law, 103 IOWA 
L. REV., 2229, 2229–30 (2018). 
30 Ortiz-Ospina et al., supra note 27. 
31 Id. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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capabilities to offer services and solutions to complement their products.35 This trend 
suggests that the market demand for higher standards of service will steadily rise and 
a successful response to this demand will offer beneficial opportunities.36 
International trade requires the support of financial and non-financial 
institutions. These institutions are both obvious (e.g., law enforcement) and more 
obscure (e.g., institutions providing countries with credit), and they include country-
specific institutions (e.g., knowledge of foreign languages). “[P]roducers in exporting 
countries often need credit in order to engage in trade.”37 According to recent 
studies, “financially developed economies—those with more dynamic private credit 
markets—typically outperform exporters with less developed financial institutions.”38 
Thus, the availability of trustworthy financial experts is critical to success in 
international trade.  
Moreover, there is a link between prosperity and availability of trustworthy 
experts, such as legal and financial service providers. The intricacy of global trade 
networks, the increasing number of transactions, and the need for experts raise the 
demand for trust. Arguably, countries with an established culture of institutional 
trust are more likely to flourish, while countries with poorer institutional trust lose 
opportunities because of the costs and risks associated with mistrust. 
 
B. Migration is facilitating cultural exchange as well as the transfer of law. Law is evolving 
to reflect the changes in national social structures. 
Technological developments have facilitated migration across increasingly 
diverse geographical pathways.39 First, technological change has lowered financial 
restraints on mobility because it has significantly reduced the cost of travel and 
communication.40 Second, increased mobility has strengthened migrant networks and 
transnational ties by enabling immigrants to maintain connections with family and 
friends, to remit money, and to travel back and forth between their countries of 
residence and origin.41 Third, rising literacy rates, increased access to formal 
education, and improved access to “global” information through (satellite) television, 
mobile phones, and the internet seem to have increased society’s aspirations and 
awareness of previously unknown opportunities in other countries.42 Combined, 
these developments may have increased people’s abilities and aspirations to migrate.  
 
35 INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO STRATEGY FOR SERVICE STANDARDIZATION 
(2016), https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/archive/pdf/en/the_iso_strategy_for_servi 
ce_standardization.pdf (emphasizing the importance of setting a standardization strategy for catching 
up with the so-called “servitization” trend). 
36 Id. 
37 Ortiz-Ospina et al., supra note 27. 
38 Id. 
39 Mathias Czaika & Hein de Haas, The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More 
Migratory?, 48 INT’L. MIGRATION REV. 283, 284 (2015). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. (citing Hein de Haas, Mobility and Human Development, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME HUMAN 
DEV. REPS. (2009)).  
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Today’s migratory and media-connected world offers abundant information 
from the “global cultural supermarket” to individuals.43 Today, we have more 
freedom to formulate our own identity by exposure to elements from other 
cultures.44 When “[a] group of people have a common culture… they have common 
codes. With the aid of such a common system of codes it is possible to communicate 
group affiliation to the environment, to the group and to oneself.”45 Interaction with 
people from other cultures may lead to shared values and ease the process of 
identifying with others.  
Further, migration is an important component for the transfer of law.46 To 
be sure, the culture of “sending” and “receiving” societies are still important in 
assessing the fate of transplanted rules.47 Law reflects changes in culture and societal 
structure as well.48 Thus, a major reason for recognizing and developing a separate 
body of universal fiduciary law is that society is evolving into a culture which is 
predominantly affected by fiduciary relations.49 The body of law governing fiduciary 
relations can affect and be affected by this social trend.50 
 
C. As major corporate scandals highlighted shortcomings of corporate governance 
regulations, concerns about corporate cultures rose. 
In 2014, Brazil was shaken by the “Lava Jato” (i.e., Operation Car Wash), 
which was likely the biggest corruption scandal in history. Investigations uncovered a 
vast and extraordinarily intricate web of corruption51 in which officials awarded 
contracts at inflated rates to the state-controlled oil company Petrobras. This scandal 
has caused a huge fallout in Brazilian equities.52 In Japan, concerns about corporate 
governance laws arose after the accounting scandals of the Olympus and Toshiba 
Corporations, and Tepco executives’ professional negligence in taking measures 
against the tsunami that caused the nuclear meltdowns in Fukushima.53 The 
“Satyam” fiasco, which included falsification of financial accounts, was the catalyst 
 
43 See generally GORDON MATTHEWS, GLOBAL CULTURE/INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: SEARCHING 
FOR HOME IN THE CULTURAL SUPERMARKET (2000) (discussing globalization, culture and identity). 
44 Id. at 5. 
45 Philip M. Nichols, The Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazakhstani Reception of a Transplanted 
Foreign Investment Code, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1235, 1237 (1997) (citing Jorgen Selmer, “Cultural 
Groups” and the Study of Life-Styles and Cultural Identity, in TRADITION AND CULTURAL IDENTITY 47, 57 
(Lauri Honko ed., 1988)). 
46 See Prakash Shah, Globalization and the Challenge of Asian Legal Transplants in Europe, 
SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 348, 349 (2005) (citing MASAJI CHIBA, LEGAL CULTURES IN HUMAN 
SOCIETY, 20–21 (2002)). 
47 Id. at 348. 
48 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 798 (1983). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Jonathan Watts, Operation Car Wash: Is This The Biggest Corruption Scandal In History?, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-car-
wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-in-history.  
52 Claire Felter & Rocio Cara Labrador, Brazil’s Corruption Fallout, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazils-corruption-fallout. 
53 See, e.g., Joel Slawotsky, The Virtues of Shareholder Value Driven Activism: Avoiding Governance 
Pitfalls, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 521, 558–61 (2016). 
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for India’s extensive corporate governance reforms.54 Corporation from the United 
States and a number of European countries have not lagged behind.55 
These scandals may have raised concerns about the prevailing business 
cultures, which promote self-interest and measure corporate success in monetary 
gain regardless of how it is achieved.56 Each scandal led to an intensive corporate 
governance reform and a codification movement in both common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. As demonstrated later in the fourth part of this Article, both legal 
systems offered similar fiduciary principles, even though, as noted below, their 
methods and approaches differ. In common law jurisdictions, fiduciary law is rooted 
in the law of property, whereas in civil law jurisdictions, fiduciary principles are 
rooted in contract law.  
 
D. Fiduciary law is spreading in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. To be 
effective, however, a unified approach may be critical. 
Although both systems have different approaches, in global relationships 
there is a crucial need for uniform principles and laws to reduce, if not eliminate, 
abuse of fiduciaries’ powers. The pressures for uniform rules arose when non-legal 
principles became insufficient to provide sustainable trust relationships. It is crucial 
to understand not only the rules, but also the sources and foundations of fiduciary 
rules from other countries. Understanding the same language is not enough if the 
underlying history and context differ. 
As noted, in order to reconcile differences between fiduciary laws of various 
countries, one should identify the universal systems on which most legal systems are 
built. In fact, we are dealing mainly with two legal systems: common law and civil 
law. We can analyze the sources of fiduciary principles in common law and civil law 
and then identify the underlying differences between the two systems. This process 
will identify the common source principles on which both systems are based. 
Ultimately, there is an argument for adopting a hybrid system of fiduciary law, built 
upon broad unifying principles that could apply in both common law and civil law 
jurisdictions.57  
There are many advantages to unifying fiduciary law: first, a uniform law may 
be more helpful in establishing trusting relationships across state boundaries. Second, 
the unification of the governing rules reduces the cost of designing agreements 
among parties. After all, just as the mixing of languages is costlier than a uniform 
language, so a mixture of different legal rules is costlier than a rule drawn and based 
on one system. Third, a common, unified language helps foster ideas of trust and 
trustworthiness, and generate a better understanding of morality. Unification leads to 
a common understanding and compromises rather than a fight for “winning my 
way.” Fourth, unification avoids the need for a third-party arbitrator between two 
 
54 See, e.g., Garima et al., The Satyam Failure, 15 INT’L BUS. J. 28 (2015). 
55 See, e.g., Jason M. Halper et al., Revisions Proposed to the UK Corporate Governance Code: An 
Overview and Comparison with Aspects of US Corporate Governance, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/revisions-proposed-to-uk-corporate-governance-code-overvie 
w-and-comparison-aspects. 
56 FRANKEL, supra note 13, at 101–02. 
57 See generally Tamar Frankel, Toward Universal Fiduciary Principles, 39 QUEEN’S L. J. 391 (2014) 
(providing a detailed comparative analysis of fiduciary law in common law and civil law jurisdictions 
as well as discussing the methods to reconcile the two different legal systems). 
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systems and for seeking compromises. Therefore, although the foundations of two 
legal systems are different and can remain intact, we can recognize that both systems 
aim at achieving a similar mission. The question is: how can the mission of these two 
different systems follow a uniform approach?  
 
E. Nations have absorbed the fiduciary principles and legal transplantation has taken place in 
different legal systems. 
1. The experience of Japan 
Japan’s adoption of the duty of loyalty for corporate directors illustrates how 
a legal transplant (i.e., a transfer of legal rules to another culture) may become part of 
the legal system, dressed in traditional garb over time, as the legal infrastructure and 
political economy change and affect the motivation of the legal professionals who 
interpret and enforce the transplant.58  
In Japanese law, relations between a corporation and its directors are mainly 
governed by the law of agency.59 In accordance with agency law, which applies to all 
agency relationships, directors owe a duty to exercise the care of a faithful manager 
while carrying out their work and pursuing the goal of the agency relationship.60 
Directors owe an additional duty of loyalty derived from corporate law.61 Japanese 
courts interpret corporate directors’ duty of care as a component of their duty of 
loyalty. This interpretation may have been influenced, in part, by the fact that, in 
Japan, corporate directors are generally corporate officers, who are responsible for 
what happens under their leadership at all levels of the organization.62 Under this 
approach the scope of duty of care is broader than its equivalent in the common law 
system.63 In addition, Japanese courts are less deferential to the “business judgment 
rule” as compared to courts in the United States.64 Despite these nuanced 
differences, the substance of corporate fiduciary duties is similar in both systems. For 
example, both systems prohibit transactions that give rise to the directors’ personal 
enjoyment of corporate opportunities and that engage in self-dealing, and both 
systems relieve directors from such a prohibition upon disclosing any material facts 





58 Id. at 423. 
59 Ramseyer & Tamaruya, supra note 2, at 5. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Frankel, supra note 58, at 424. 
63 Compare In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
with Nishimura v. Abekawa (The Daiwa Bank Case), 1573 Shoji Homu 4, 4 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Sept. 20, 
2000) (quoted in Ramseyer & Tamaruya, supra note 2, at 11) (holding that each director has the duty 
to understand and manage the risks properly by maintaining a risk management system appropriate to 
the scale and nature of the firm’s business as a part of his duties of faithful care and loyalty) and Nihon 
gakki seizo, K.K. v. Kobayashi, 286 Hanrei Taimuzu 360 (Tokyo High Ct., July 28, 1972), (quoted in 
Ramseyer & Tamaruya, supra note 2, at 9) (holding that an interim director breached his duties by 
entrusting the firm work to his subordinates despite a good faith manager’s duties of care, loyalty and 
social responsibility). 
64 Ramseyer & Tamaruya, supra note 2, at 6. 
65 Id. at 5. 
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2. The experience of China 
The history of trust law in China provides an interesting example of legal 
transplantation. The communist society facilitated a use for a legal tool originally 
designed to protect English landowners from the overarching government.66 This 
use may demonstrate the flexible character of fiduciary law. China adopted the Trust 
Law of the People's Republic of China “to provide a legal foundation for the 
regulation of financial trust services and charitable activities” on October 1, 2001.67 
In Charles Zhen Qu’s words, “How well these legislative objectives are achieved will 
depend on how the common law principles are embodied in the Trust Law in 
China…. China’s legal system, although still being developed, is basically a civil law 
system.”68 
Charles Zhen Qu suggested that the trust law in China “will not be of much 
practical value if it cannot be interpreted in light of civil law principles. Civil lawyers 
cannot viably approach their own trust law with common law principles.”69 He 
further asserted that:  
 
[a] relationship analysis helps answer the questions because the trust law was 
made to regulate trust relationships. The roles of each party to a trust, are 
determined by how the concept of trust is defined, how a trust is created, and 
when a trust is constituted under the trust law.70  
 
For example, because the regulations governing trust businesses do not reflect 
“civil” and “commercial” trust categories set forth by the trust taw, the establishment 
of small-scale family businesses and civil trusts becomes almost practically 
impossible.71 In this vein, Chinese scholars seek specific rules for legal trusts.  
Chinese scholars point out that even if beneficiaries are aware [of the existence 
of a trust], rules that promote secrecy of trusts may make it impossible for 
beneficiaries to fulfill the role American trust law assigns them as enforcer of trusts. 
Because no record exists of an invisible trust's purpose, property, parties, or fiduciary 
rights and duties, beneficiaries lack the information they need to monitor a trustee 
and hold that trustee accountable for any misconduct. Indeed, secrecy of trusts may 
effectively deny beneficiaries any claim whatsoever to trust property. As Zhong 
Ruidong and Chen Xiangcong observed, “if the trust is not established in writing, 
after a considerable period of time, when the beneficiary asserts his beneficial rights, 
no evidence [of those rights] will exist.” To Chinese authors, the inevitable result is 




66 Stephen Tensmeyer, Modernizing Chinese Trust Law, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 710, 712 (2015). 
67 Charles Zhen Qu, The Doctrinal Basis of the Trust Principles in China’s Trust Law, 38 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 345, 347 (2003); see generally Frances H. Foster, American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 602 (2010) (exploring the background of China’s adoption of the classic “Anglo-
American” concept of trust as well as the systemic flaws in American trust law). 
68 Zhen Qu, supra note 68, at 347. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Tensmeyer, supra note 67, at 712. 
72 Foster, supra note 68, at 646 (footnotes omitted). 
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3. The experience of South Korea and Taiwan 
Taiwan provides an example of reconciling of common law and civil law 
systems by a “sliding movement.” While the current system is maintained, a partial 
use of an alternative system with slow adoption can lead to full adoption of the 
common law, civil law, or a hybrid of both.73 Scholars have observed that while civil 
law judges have been paying far more attention to precedents, common law judges 
paid attention to the written law and the codes.74 Fiduciary law may be more 
amenable to this form of “sliding” because the category of fiduciaries is open-ended, 
offering flexibility. For instance, Choong Kee Lee proposed that common law 
fiduciary principles could be integrated into Korean law as a subset of good faith and 
sincerity principles, encouraging Korean judges to exercise more discretion.75 
Although there are various types of fiduciary relationships that have been 
continuously evolving, the fundamental objectives of fiduciary laws are the same or 
very similar. These objectives may appear in different systems and jurisdictions, and 
they require the same or very similar treatment by law depending on the social and 
cultural pressures of the population.  
Taiwan has imported the duty of loyalty by copying Japan’s Article 254-3, 
which imposes a duty of loyalty on corporate directors.76 Like Japan, a commentator 
has suggested that the fiduciaries’ duty of loyalty is poised to play a role in corporate 
governance because the two countries demonstrate similarities from legal, political, 
and economic perspectives.77 It may take years (as it did in Japan) for other countries 
to adopt the duty of loyalty, and even though these countries may develop substitute 
rules,78 the essence of the duty of loyalty is similar, regardless of how it is named.  
Contrary to the approach of most scholars to date, it is virtually impossible to 
discuss the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of wholesale transplants of entire bodies of law (such 
as Japan's transplantation of codes in the European Civil Law tradition in the late 
19th century), or to extrapolate meaningfully from a single rule to the feasibility of 
legal transplants in general. Each legal rule or institution must be examined 
individually, and an assessment of the overall feasibility of legal transplants as a form 
of legal change shows that a more rigorous theoretical base than existing literature 
has provided, is needed.79 
As seen in the harmonization of European Union and United States 
securities regulations, these barriers are not easy to overcome.80 However, the 
benefits of creating a single securities market may justify the efforts.81 The 
codification trend to adopt open and general rules in civil law jurisdictions gave 
 
73 Frankel, supra note 58, at 425. 
74 Id. 
75 Choong Kee Lee, How to Adopt and Develop Anglo-American Concept of Fiduciary Law in a Civil 
Law System: A Korean Perspective, http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_071736.pdf 
(last visited on Dec. 31, 2018). 
76 Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty 
in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 888 (2003) (citing Japanese statute). 
77 Frankel, supra note 58, at 425. 
78 See Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 77, at 900–01. 
79 Id. 
80 Eric J. Pan, Harmonization of U.S.-EU Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European Securities 
Regulator, 34 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 499, 536 (2003). 
81 Id. 
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courts more room to interpret these rules and develop more focused and specific 
approaches.82 For instance, the Dutch Civil Code of 1992 abandoned the “traditional 
hierarchy among the different sources of law.”83 Similarly, Article 1261 of the 
Quebec Civil Code declares that a trust patrimony is distinct from that of the trustee 
or beneficiary and is a “patrimony by appropriation” (patrimoine d’affectation).84 The 
Law of Obligations in the civil law system is divided into general and specific rules. 
According to this division, general rules are applicable so long as no special 
provisions were set for the case at bar.  
In accordance with the general provisions in the civil law system, trusts that 
are similar to common law trusts can be established. In contrast, the Supreme Court 
of Canada imposed a common law trust on the Crown in Canada holding that the 
Crown was a fiduciary of an aboriginal community that lived in Canada based on 
assertions to the community made prior to entering into a contract, even though the 
Crown was not a trustee of the community in the strict sense of the word.85 The 
Crown was considered to be a fiduciary in the sense of the power relationship with 
the aboriginal community with whom it had signed the contract.86 
 
IV. PART FOUR: INTEGRATING FIDUCIARY LAW INTO DIFFERENT LAWS AND 
CULTURES 
A. How did common law and civil law jurisdictions introduce and incorporate fiduciary laws into 
their legal framework? 
1. Common law and civil law are the two governing legal systems around the globe. 
Both systems have similar interests and motivations to promote trust in legal 
relationships. Fiduciary laws are highly beneficial in encouraging society members to 
interact, accumulate funds through investments, spending, and payment of taxes as 
well as avoiding costly duplication of services.87 Both systems herald moral, honest 
and fair behavior among interacting parties.  
Even though they share the same goal, however, their ways of implementing 
these goals differ. Common law and civil law legal systems seek to reach this goal by 
different rules and through different routes.88 These differences may produce 
different rights, judicial approaches and detailed rules. Indeed, there were periods in 
which the two systems intersected. The common law drew on Roman law in the 
17th century,89 and Latin words are still used in some contexts today.90 However, the 
 
82 Frankel, supra note 58, at 426. 
83 Salvatore Mancuso, The New African Law: Beyond the Difference Between Common Law and Civil 
Law, 14 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 39, 44 (2008). 
84 Frankel, supra note 58, at 426. 
85 Id. 
86 See Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town), [2001] S.C.R. 746 (Can.). 
87 Alex Gray, A Question of Confidence: The Countries with the Most Trusted Governments, WORLD 
ECON. FORUM (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/the-countries-with-the-
most-and-least-trusted-governments/.  
88 Frankel, supra note 58, at 394. 
89 C.H. van Rhee, Trusts, Trust-Like Concepts and Ius Commune, 8 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 453, 455 
(2000), reprinted in TRUSTS IN MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 8:3 (Michael Milo & Jan Smits eds., 2001).  
90 See, e.g., Paul S. Gillies, Latin in Vermont Law, 28 VERMONT B. J. 15, 16 (2002) (“Latin words 
are placeholders for concepts, but the elegant phrases of the English common law are chains of words 
making so perfect an exposition of a legal principle that they resisted translation all those years.”). 
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current regulation on trusted experts differs in each system, drawing on a 
fundamentally different structure and culture. It is also enforced with a different 
judicial process. As noted, the common law draws the regulation of fiduciaries 
mainly from property law, while in the civil law the regulation is based on contract. In 
the common law the judicial process is managed more actively by the parties in an 
adversarial mode as compared to the more passive parties and more “hands-on” civil 
law judges.91 
 
2. Although two essentially different legal systems have the same goals, their methods of 
reaching these goals are quite different. 
For instance, the property law system in common law is bifurcated to entitle 
a party other than the legal owner to benefit from a property. In civil law, however, 
the title of a property resides in a single owner, and one may become a fiduciary 
based on a contractual relationship which assumes that the power of the contracting 
parties is equal and that fairness is inherent in contracts.92  
As international trade expands and relationships among strangers come 
closer, scholars and practitioners in common law and civil law jurisdictions would 
benefit from adjusting their agreements and rules towards a more unified approach.93 
With the increase of global commerce and finance, the importance of the laws 
designed to strengthen trust relationships is rising. Its importance is rising in 
proportion to the costs of verifying honesty and the moral behavior of others. A 
unified legal language, even if pronounced in different accents and intonations, can 
lead to shared values, better understanding, and stronger relationships.94 
 
3. The common law anchors its regulation of fiduciary relationship in equity and property 
law while the basis of civil law’s regulation of fiduciary relationships is statutory contract law. 
Common law focuses on protecting entrusted property or power. Therefore, 
it imposes duties on fiduciaries to prevent misappropriation of entrusted property 
and misuse of entrusted power.95 By contrast, civil law imposes fiduciary duties to 
avoid unfair and immoral terms of an agreement and enforce contractual obligations, 
provided that these obligations are fair and moral. In this system, fiduciaries have the 
legal ownership of property or the right to exercise power and the beneficial 
ownership of property, and power belongs to their entrustors.96 Therefore, 
fiduciaries may not entertain their conflicting interests or act carelessly. 
 
91 See FRANKEL, supra note 13, at 79–99; see also TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW: ANALYSIS, 
DEFINITIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, DUTIES, REMEDIES OVER HISTORY AND CULTURE 7–23 (2008); 
Dominik Lengeling, Common Law and Civil Law–Differences, Reciprocal Influences and Points of 
Intersection (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
92 Frankel, supra note 58, at 400. 
93 See Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 369 (2001).  
94 Frankel, supra note 58, at 395. 
95 FRANKEL, supra note 13, at 108. 
96 A similar approach was adopted in Roman law. Roman fiduciary law imposed a duty on a 
true owner of a slave to abide by the slave’s contracts with third parties. It also imposed on a gift’s 
recipient under a will—such as slaves—the duty to free the slaves according to the request of the 
trustor. In both cases, the reason for the recognition of a fiduciary relationship was the laws that did 
not recognize a slave’s obligation (being property) and the trustor’s directive to act rather than merely 
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4. The common law puts great weight on the ability of the entrustor to protect his interests 
from the fiduciaries’ abuse of power. 
Society expects entrustors to bear the reasonable costs designed to verify and 
control the trustworthiness of others with whom they deal to the extent possible.97 
In contrast to common law, civil law focuses on the fairness of the terms between 
the fiduciaries and entrustors. There is an inherent contractual duty to act ethically and 
morally. 
The emphasis on morality in the two systems is not drastic, yet notable. For 
decades, American courts have mentioned morality while discussing breach of 
fiduciary duties. For example, a court decision notes that equity applicable to the 
fiduciary relationship is “based on the highest morality,”98 and a claim against an 
attorney must demonstrate a breach of fiduciary duties involving immoral behavior.99 
Fiduciary duties raise “the highest and truest principles of morality.”100 There is a 
“need for enforcement of commercial morality in fiduciary relationships.”101 In case 
law, the emphasis is not as much attached to misappropriation and misuse of 
entrustment as is it attached to the terms of the relationship. As one court noted, 
“[S]tandards of corporate morality and fiduciary duties may be different in West 
Germany.”102  
In civil law jurisdictions, contracts draw on statutory law, which prohibits 
trusted persons from breaking their promise or acting immorally. A civil law lawyer 
who wishes to create an arrangement similar to a common law trust, could do so by 
finding a similar statutory design in their own jurisdiction.103 In addition, civil law 
includes a broader definition of unethical and immoral behavior compared to 
common law, as it draws on statutes as well as the courts’ statutory interpretations. 
However, in both systems, remedies against the fiduciary may also reflect the level of 
wrongful behavior and immorality.  
 
receive property under the will. Rather than change the laws, the rules allowed for deviations. 
FRANKEL, supra note 13, at 90–91. 
97 The emphasis in this description of fiduciary law is not accepted by everyone in the common 
law system. Some scholars argue for viewing fiduciary law as part of common law contract, in which 
each party must fend for itself. However, the disagreement focuses on the degree to which the 
entrustors can reduce or eliminate their risks from abuse of fiduciaries’ power, and the extent to 
which society is harmed by abuse of fiduciaries’ entrusted power. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, 
The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998); see 
also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus 
Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002).  
98 Alcorn v. Alcorn, 194 F. 275, 278 (W.D. Miss. 1911). 
99 See In re Franke, 345 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 1984); Burton v. Slaughter, 67 Va. 914 (1875); J.S.T. 
Dev. Corp. v. Vitrano, No. CV030521186S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2136 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 
22, 2004). 
100 Samba Enters., LLC v. iMesh, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 7660, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23393 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2009) aff’d, 390 F. App’x 55 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Sokoloff v. Harriman Estates 
Dev. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 409, 416 (2001); see also K.M. Sharma, From “Sanctity” to “Fairness:” An Uneasy 
Transition in the Law of Contracts?, 18 N.Y.U  J. INT’L & COMP. L. 95 (1999). 
101 Kilbarr Corp. v. Business Systems, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 422, 424 (D.N.J. 1988).  
102 USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807, 812 (D. Ky. 1982). 
103 See John Henry Merryman, Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme by Lawson), 48 TUL. L. 
REV. 916, 939 (1974) (“[M]any of the functions served by the trust can be achieved in [a civil] legal 
system by using indigenous institutions, but each such arrangement would be significantly different in 
legal structure and in legal consequences from the trust.”). 
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B. The distinctions between two systems are important 
1. The property law umbrella of fiduciary law seems more suitable for the common law 
system, while the contract rules umbrella seems to fit the civil law system better. 
Common law courts will enforce contracts among independent parties and 
give effect to the substance of their agreement. Under civil law, the courts will seek 
authority in statutes to determine the validity of a contract. The court may also 
decide on the fairness and morality of terms based on the parties’ independence and 
ability to form contracts for themselves. Thus, there are fundamental distinctions 
between a contract formed by the parties’ negotiated terms, and a contract based on 
a code provision. This distinction has important consequences relating to the source 
of the law and the role of judges in determining the interpretation of contracts.  
 
2. The existence of bifurcated property rights, as compared to contract promises, has serious 
consequences for the followers of each system. 
Habits and cultures are hard to change, just as they are hard to establish.104 
The efforts of Professor Louis Loss, the creator of securities regulation as an area of 
law, successfully combined various securities acts into a code. His efforts underscore 
the difficulty of changing habits. He hoped that the U.S. Congress would adopt the 
Code and that members of the Bar would use it. The American Law Institute and a 
group of expert members worked on the Code. It contained over 3,000 sections, 
balancing directives and smoothing contradictions.105 Yet, instead of adopting the 
entire Code, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted only certain 
innovative provisions.106 The Code itself did not become law.107 
Why was this Code not adopted and why did it lose the Bar’s support? One 
answer is related to the high cost involved in teaching practitioners the new section 
numbers of the Code. “Everyone understands when you say section 5 violation of 
the 1933 Act and section 17(a) of the 1940 Act,” stated one renowned securities 
lawyer, “But in the Code these are designated by entirely different numbers. No one 
wishes to learn new numbers now.”108  
As “[t]he Hague Report concludes, ‘[T]he mainstream in the Civil Law 
characterization of the trust . . . emphasizes its flexibility and sees it as a contract-like 
institution. . . .’”109 “In Europe, contract does the work of trust.”110 When building 
 
104 Frankel, supra note 58, at 421. 
105 Id. 
106 See Jeffery D. Bauman, Loss and Seligman on Securities Regulation: An Essay for Don Schwartz, 78 
GEO. L. J. 1753, 1780 (1990) (reviewing LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 
(1989) and noting the impact of the American Law Institute’s proposed Federal Securities Code on 
the Securities Exchange Commission); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES 
CODE §§ 401–406, 1704(g) (1978) (examples of Code provisions adopted), cited in Bauman, supra, at 
1780.  
107 Bauman, supra note 107, at 1776. 
108 Interview with anonymous source. 
109 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L. J. 625, 670 (1995) 
(citing Adair Dyer & Hans van Loon, Report on Trusts and Analogous Institutions, in HAGUE 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION: TRUSTS - 
APPLICABLE LAW AND RECOGNITION 10, 11 (1985)). 
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blocks of different legal systems conflict, the chances of changing these building 
blocks in order to combine the two systems are very slim. No wonder the current 
literature on the sources and interaction between the common law and civil law 
demonstrates disagreements and uncertainty.  
 
3. The goal shared by both common law and civil law 
Both systems share common goals in seeking to overcome rigid rules and 
searching for justice and fair treatment of parties. We should recognize the vision 
and objective of the two systems. Common law and civil law jurisdictions seek to 
achieve justice in the name of the sovereign, i.e., the head of state.111 According to 
Salvatore Mancuso, there is a commonality of values that constitutes a basis for these 
two jurisdictions: 
Civil and common law seem to converge into a larger and more 
comprehensive Western liberal democratic family of legal systems, where some 
common values about law and democracy, as well as general legal principles in the 
area of public, administrative, criminal and private laws are shared by the legal 
traditions. Although a general sub-distinction between common law and civil law still 
persists, the major distinctions between them, however, have been greatly diluted in a 
continuous convergence between the two legal traditions clearly evident from the 
current harmonization initiatives taken within the European legal community.112 
It is doubtful whether this description reflects the practice under the two 
systems. However, this description may point to the future. These foundational 
principles may pave the road to uniformity. For example, while one system may view 
law as limiting the actors’ freedom, another system may stress the law as the source 
of legal rights. Both views can be adapted to view law as a source of the victims’ 
rights against abusers of the victims’ freedom.113 That is especially true for fiduciary 
rules. Similarly, while bifurcation of property can represent the feudalism of the past, 
where the powerful party held its power by force and by law, today, the seemingly 
powerful party in a fiduciary relationship is the servant endowed with power by the 
other party.114 Bifurcation of property rights may be viewed as the tool for protecting 
the true owners who lack physical control over his or her property, against the 
 
110 Id. (citing FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 23 (John Brunyate 
rev. ed., 2d ed. 1936) (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1st ed. 1909), cited in Dyer & van Loon, 
supra note 110, at 40). F.H. Lawson writes, “[T]he three-cornered relation of settlor, trustee, and 
[beneficiary] . . . is easily explained in the modern law in terms of a contract for the benefit of a third 
party.” F.H. LAWSON, THE THOMAS M. COOLEY LECTURES: A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE 
CIVIL LAW 200 (5th ed. 1953). 
111 It has been suggested that “Roman, Canon and Germanic law (sources of the European Ius-
Commune tradition) have provided elements of the [English] law of trust.” van Rhee, supra note 90, at 
454. William Blackstone’s use of Roman law categories in systematizing English law is a perfect 
example of the interaction between two different legal systems. It is also important to note that 
England’s equity law has not developed in an orderly fashion. The Court of Chancery may have had 
its roots as an administrative entity that administrated the king’s justice. See Timothy S. Haskett, The 
Medieval English Court of Chancery, 14 L. & HIST. REV. 245 (1996).  
112 Mancuso, supra note 84, at 45. 
113 Frankel, supra note 58, at 422–23. 
114 Id. at 423.  
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servants on whom the owner must depend, when such dependence is socially 
desirable.115 
 
D. Towards a universal fiduciary rule. 
As mentioned in the third part of this Article, a homogenous international 
legal system has many advantages. Unified laws establish trusting relationships across 
state boundaries, reduce the cost of agreements, bring together different ideas of 
trust and faithfulness, and raise a better understanding of morality. Absent the 
friction caused by legal disparities, the parties are more likely to reach an 
understanding and compromise. Additionally, an integrated legal system would avoid 
the inconveniencies caused by imperfect legal comparisons, distinctions, explanations 
and interpretations.116  
 
1. Establishing principles. 
Unifying two different legal systems is not an easy task. If we ignored the 
source of the principles but articulated the principles, we could agree on a set of 
principles that each system follows today and may undertake to follow in the future. 
In contrast to rules, principles do not prescribe the righteousness or falsity of a 
behavior, but rather “provide an abstract method or procedure for determining the 
morality [or legitimacy] of a line of action” that can lead to more specific rules.117 
Therefore, the principles of unified fiduciary law should be less prescriptive and 
limited in scope so that they can provide the flexibility necessary for rules to evolve 
and therefore ease the process of embodying these same principles in different legal 
systems. 
There are reasons for creating a platform of uniform international principles 
for select types of fiduciaries, such as corporate management, directors, trustees, or 
partners. The choice of a particular type of fiduciary should respond to need and 
circumstances. For example, if trusts are used in the process of securitization, and 
that process is worldwide, there may be a significant need for unifying the rules that 
govern trustees who deal only in this type of position.  
If the laws governing directors or partners have been unified, the experience 
of unification in this context can be followed and provide extremely fruitful lessons. 
Yet, the more detailed the rules are, the more difficult it will be for the benefits of 
this system to carry over into other contexts. By contrast, the more general the 
principles are, the broader their application will be, and there will be a better chance 
for principles to follow. Perhaps uniform rules may take hold if the number of the 
actors and their types is relatively small, the fiduciary relationships that are chosen 
are the least complicated, and the existing rules are the least diverse.  
 
2. Embodying the same principles in different legal systems. 
Like any legal system, if a multi-system is not carved in granite, it may be 
more amenable to unification. There are also benefits in diversity of approaches to 
 
115 Id. 
116 Id.  
117 Singer, supra note 22, at 294–95. 
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solve the same or similar problems.118 As much as diversity results in additional 
confusion and costs, it may also offer a field experiment in different solutions.119 
Perhaps, in time, this process will give rise to a unified or fractured, but well-
understood, system.  
There is a reason for optimism about the development of a better legal 
system in the future. That is because the shared problems that caused the adoption 
of different laws are persistent. The interaction between different societies has never 
been greater than in today’s world. People are learning to speak each other’s language 
and someday they may successfully create a combined, somewhat new language. I 
conclude that a unified legal system is not only more desirable but also more 
feasible.120  
Even though we discussed unifying two major legal systems, most legal 
systems are not entirely uniform. For instance, specific rules of sub-groups (e.g., 
family) may diverge from the general rules that apply to small communities.  
The conflict of laws rules in the United States are an example of how a multi-
layered legal system may function.121 It is governed by general principles and 
enforced by a single mechanism. Beneath the general principles, there is a layer of 
law in more detail: federal law, that applies to all, and beneath that layer there are 
state laws, municipal laws, and the laws of other small communities. Each layer 
offers choices to the citizens. In some cases, the same entity may be governed by 
different legal systems. In the United States, while corporations can determine the 
laws that will govern their internal affairs by choosing the State of incorporation, 
operations of the corporations are governed by the laws of the State where they are 
performed. Therefore, every system contains methods to reconcile a diverse set of 
rules. 
3. Providing a structure of choice of law. 
The legal pyramid in the United States creates a hierarchy of norms in which 
Congress may superimpose rules and preempt state law within the frame of the U.S. 
Constitution. However, there are many statutes that allow the two systems to operate 
together.122 In such cases, the courts determine the extent to which state law may 
apply notwithstanding the imposition of federal law.123 Alternatively, we may 
consider developing choice of law rules in fiduciary law, similar to those in the 
United States, rather than the unification of different legal systems. This is especially 
considerable when the values and ultimate results in different jurisdictions are 
similar. 
Greater uniformity is necessary especially for transactions that require 
predictability, such as promissory notes and bills of exchange, which involve 
everyday transfers of funds. In line with the harmonization efforts in the European 
 
118 Frankel, supra note 58, at 434. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (listing 
choice-of-law principles for determining which local law should be applied). 
122 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1-64 (2011); but see 15 U.S.C. § 35(b). 
123 See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
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Union, scholars have argued that the European Parliament should favor the eventual 
adoption of “a common civil code for all of Europe.”124 In Rodolfo Sacco’s words: 
 
If the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century celebrated 
the inherently national character of law, the second part of the 20th century 
evinces an awareness of the inherent unity of law, and the inherent value of 
uniform legal rules. . . . There can be no doubt that conflicts of law are 
interfering with trade. Uniform law means cultural unity, and thus the 
elimination of misunderstandings and difficulties between different 
civilizations that must get on together.125 
 
According to this view, uniformity of specific rules is not merely desirable 
but is necessary126 in today’s world, depending on the context of the relationships 
and the frequency of their use.  
On the other hand, some situations pose strong tendencies and desires 
against uniformity. For example, the private character of wills and wills-substitutes 
often reflect the strong desire of the testator to keep his or her freedom to change 
the terms and shield the terms of the wills from publicity. For this reason, some 
jurisdictions in the United States declined to adopt uniform state laws in the face of 
testator’s privacy rights, and instead followed a more nuanced approach.127  
 
4. Establishing an implementing court. 
If a process implementing a dual or hybrid system is adopted, it must be 
accompanied by, and indeed will depend on, an implementing judiciary. Similar to 
the International Court of Justice or the International Court of Arbitration, there 
could be an International Court of Fiduciary Law.128 This international judicial 
system could be primarily based on case law, created by the judges that represent 
both common law and civil law jurisdictions. Therefore, the decisions would reflect 
conclusions that are based on a hybrid legal analysis. 
The importance and value of such a court is its weakness. The fact that all 
other courts would be backed by strong governments, and that no strong 
government will accept the decision of another strong government, may lead to 
implementation of the law by a weaker court.129 There is a risk that the implementing 
court will be biased, showing sensitiveness to the trends and strong convictions of 
those who appointed it. In this case, the outcome would likely be affected by more 
powerful members that have an interest in the resolution.  
In this sense, the evolution of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) offers an instructive example. Online, names embody not 
 
124 Rodolfo Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 171, 171 (2001) 
[hereinafter Diversity and Uniformity in the Law] (footnotes omitted); see also Rodolfo Sacco, Unification 
and Certainty: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
(1984). 
125 Diversity and Uniformity in the Law, supra note 125, at 171–72. 
126 See Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 38 ARIZ. 
ST. L. J. 713, 766–67 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
127 Id. 
128 Frankel, supra note 58, at 437–38. 
129 Id. at 438. 
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only the address but the very existence of any person. Therefore, the power to 
establish and grant names is politically and financially valuable. Initially, the 
government of the United States supported the development of the internet and 
controlled the management of domain names. As the internet developed and 
expanded, the government of the United States sought to delegate this power to 
another entity, but it wished to retain some control over the process. The Internet 
Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) ‘requests for comments’ (RFCs), which outline the 
key functions of the Internet, are now firmly asserted as copyrighted by the Internet 
Society.130  
This conflict and debate resulted in the establishment of ICANN, an 
organization with the power to establish and grant domain names: a corporation that 
does not have much power as compared to the governments that were interested in 
acquiring that power. When all or most of the countries could not agree who would 
hold the power to grant domain names, which could not be exercised by all, 
ICANN’s power was granted by default. They agreed on bestowing this power on a 
virtually powerless organization.131  
However, the source of legal change in common law and civil law somewhat 
differs from the ICANN experience. In common law, the courts are the source of 
incremental and slow legal change. Civil law jurisdictions mostly adopt legal reforms 
through legislatures, possibly paying regard to judicial precedents. However, there is 
a current codification trend in common law jurisdictions to adopt laws that reflect 
court decisions.132 Although it could be argued that common law courts will begin to 
interfere in contractual arrangements, the parties’ agreement is likely to remain as 
their starting point. In that respect, the common law is moving towards a civil law 
system.  
Civil law courts start by examining the statutes and looking for guidance in 
moral and fairness principles. Thus, depending on the legislatures, it may be easier to 
change statutes to ameliorate some of the resistance to bifurcation of property rights 
in civil law countries than in common law countries. However, a recent change in the 
French statutes was criticized as only a change on the surface, not altering the 
 
130  “The copyright is deployed as a flavor of ‘copyleft,’ meaning that it is used for the purpose 
of ensuring the widespread availability of the standards, preventing their proprietization by any 
particular party. The intellectual property behind RFCs is thus held in trust by the Internet Society—
the IETF umbrella group which still retains some influence over ICANN, and which . . . has been 
tentatively selected by ICANN to run the .org registry, providing an anticipated needed infusion of 
cash to the organization. In other words, there is no doubt that the Internet Society ‘owns’ its RFCs, 
and thus no battle is to be waged over who will rule them. There is only the question of whether the 
world at large will pay heed to them as they are published—since an RFC is not self-enforcing.” 
Jonathan Zittrain, What’s In a Name?, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 153, 163 (2002) (reviewing MILTON L. 
MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT (2002)) (footnotes omitted); see also Tamar Frankel, Governing by 
Negotiation: The Internet Naming System, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 449 (2004); Tamar Frankel, 
Accountability and Oversight of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (B. U. Sch. 
of L., Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 02-15, 2002), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=333342.  
131 Frankel, supra note 58, at 438. 
132 See, e.g., Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Policy, Legal Heritage and Financial Development: An 
Agenda for Further Research, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 379, 455 (2008) (“[T]he adoption of a lengthy 
bankruptcy code, securities regulations, and tax codes in the U.S., England, Canada, and Australia, 
among others, reflects a strong trend toward codification in common law countries.”) (citing UGO 
MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 101–21 (1997)). 
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resulting conflicts between the civil law and common law.133 Arguably, the attempt in 
China to unify common law of trusts contained similar faults and resulted in a similar 
failure. In contrast, it seems that Taiwan has enacted a statute that coherently follows 
the common law and could be used in this civil law country to establish trusts.134 In 
conclusion, it could be said that legal transplantations are still at the experimentation 
stage. 
 
V. PART FIVE: PROMOTING TRUST AT AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
A. Standardization and certification of fiduciaries’ services may be the key to ensure service 
quality and reliability. 
According to the World Bank’s statistics, commercial service exports have 
quadrupled in the last two decades.135 International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) forecasts that continuing trends of deregulation and privatization of public 
services, delocalization of supply (e.g., health services, IT assistance, call centers) and 
expansion of digital services (e.g., financial services, online commerce) will contribute 
to a growing need for international standards for the services sectors.136 
 
1. International standards touch everyone and are a part of daily life. 
The function of international standards varies from enabling the use of a 
bank card overseas to ensuring that children’s toys don’t have sharp edges.137 Their 
primary purpose is to ensure customer confidence on safety, reliability, and quality of 
products and services.138 By standardization, consumers and businesses avoid time 
and money spent on verifying trustworthiness by research, testing, and comparing 
different products.  
In line with ISO’s foundational principle, it is desirable for established 
experts, regulators and governments to set articulated standards for “the best way of 
doing things.” Standardization could be beneficial in many aspects.139 
 From the perspective of fiduciary law, most fiduciaries cannot provide 
services unless they have been previously certified by government agencies or 
professional associations. For instance, physicians, lawyers, and financial advisors 
generally may not practice without a license. However, most of the licensing 
requirements are aimed at maintaining minimum standards and may not necessarily 
promote compliance with the best practices. Additionally, compliance with local 
licensing requirements may be a weak assurance to international entrustors, especially 
when the expert’s home country lacks a sound legal infrastructure arising from 
limited, unclear, absent, or unenforced regulations. In this case, verification of the 
 
133 Valerio Forti, Comparing American Trust and French Fiducie, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 28 
(2011). 
134 Christopher C. Chen, Transplantation of Fiduciary Duties into Civil Law Jurisdiction: 
Experiences from Taiwan (Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1878204. 
135 See Commercial Service Exports (Current US$), THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org 
/indicator/TX.VAL.SERV.CD.WT (last visited Dec. 30, 2018).  
136         INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 36, at 2. 
137 INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, The Main Benefits of ISO Standards, [hereinafter The Main 
Benefits of ISO Standards] https://www.iso.org/benefits-of-standards.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2018). 
138 Id. 
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experts’ trustworthiness becomes more problematic, which may obstruct 
international trade. 
 Therefore, global investors might abstain from investing in an emerging 
market in the face of risks and costs associated with lack of expertise and potential 
fraud. In this case, all parties are likely to miss opportunities to build strategic 
alliances, enhance their businesses, and improve their gains. Further, the home 
countries of experts are likely to be deprived of foreign currency flow. Second, 
investors will most likely justify the risks arising from expert services by relying on 
the international presence, size, and prestige of a global expert, which is operational 
in the target country. However, this may not necessarily be the best alliance for any 
of the parties. For instance, there may be local service-providers available to meet the 
entrustor’s needs by higher quality services, lower prices, familiarity with the market, 
business acumen or experience. Again, there will be missed opportunities, especially 
in terms of the local experts’ ability to compete with global consultancy giants. 
 These problems may be solved by establishing an international fiduciary 
organization or mandating an existing one to set international standards for 
fiduciaries operating in various fields and certifying complying experts. This 
organization could help determine the best fiduciary practices and fill the trust gap in 
international transactions. Certified B Corporations140 provide a good example for 
this type of international certification.  
 An argument against the effectiveness of the fiduciary certification system 
could be made. This argument is based on the absence of direct enforcement powers 
such as prohibiting unauthorized practice or taking regulatory actions. However, the 
purpose of fiduciary certification should be to shed light on the expert institutional 
culture, as well as the standards adhered to by the fiduciary. For instance, the 
fiduciary certification may save a multi-national company seeking to expand its 
business in another country time and money in its search for qualified lawyers in the 
target market. 
 In addition, international standards guide governments and policymakers in 
developing better regulations.141 For example, ISO standards assist policymakers in 
reducing barriers to international trade, stimulating solutions to national, 
international and policymaking issues (e.g., disaster mitigation and recovery), and 
establishing effective policies by presenting a wide range of views and expertise.142 A 
similar structure specific to fiduciary law may provide an invaluable assistance to 
legislators, policymakers, practitioners, and fiduciaries in both common law and civil 






140 Certified B Corporations are different from the “benefit corporations” stipulated in the 
United States corporate laws. They are certified by a global non-profit organization for demonstrating 
commitment to the highest standards of social and environmental performance, public transparency, 
and legal accountability to balance profit and purpose. See About B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
https://bcorporation.net/about-b-corps (last visited Dec. 30, 2018). 
141 The Main Benefits of ISO Standards, supra note 138. 
142  Id. 
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2. Self-regulation, building an institutional culture of trust, and education may be effective 
strategies to cultivate trust internally. 
Financial institutions have grown larger; they engage in complex transactions, 
expand their activities around the globe, and make an impact both locally and 
internationally. 143 Due to their size, some financial institutions pose a systemic risk to 
the financial and economic systems of their home country and other countries in 
which they operate. The size, interaction, and impact of these institutions may render 
government regulators and examiners less effective. It has been suggested that these 
institutions are currently not only too big to fail, but also too big to regulate.144 
Expecting the courts to deliver justice and punish wayward financial 
institutions may mean waiting too long and achieving too little. The harm done can 
be devastating. Thus, in addition to demands for external regulation, oversight, and 
prosecution, a strong movement has risen to demand self-enforcement of law within 
corporations to prevent such violations from occurring.145 Indeed, there is a growing 
demand to require institutions to establish and effectively operate compliance 
programs. 
 
3. Usually, both ethics and culture establish habitual rules of behavior. 
Ethics speaks to the habits of individuals, and culture speaks to the habits of 
groups. Habits are efficient. They induce automatic behavior and reaction. However, 
they are harder to change. Yet, good ethical habits, including the habit of reviewing 
our habits periodically, can be powerful components of a compliance culture.146 As 
noted earlier, habits, cultures, and laws are difficult to change just as they are hard to 
be established. According to evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins,“[c]ultural 
transmission is analogous to genetic transmission in that, although basically 
conservative, it can give rise to a form of evolution.”147 Yet if a sufficient number of 
people or institutions follow one of the structures from a different legal system, a 
new habit and culture may develop.148  
The current model of compliance reflects our approach to enforcement. 
Institutions monitor employees for wrongdoing. They supervise, investigate and 
punish employees, and prepare themselves for regulatory examinations.149 
Traditionally, all actors in the corporation, from top management to low-level 
employees, have been subject to coercive and enforceable rules. As we study the 
evolution of compliance systems, we might also develop other forms of compliance 
programs.150 For example, it is possible to design a compliance program in which 
middle managers are rewarded for undertaking an additional function along with 
their managerial duties to identify and correct mistakes and wrongful actions.151 This 
 
143 See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, THE LAW OF INSTITUTIONAL SELF-REGULATION 
(COMPLIANCE) (2018) (discussing the means of self-regulation and their contribution to businesses). 
144 Ryan Tracy & Victoria McGrane, Fed to Banks: Shape Up or Risk Breakup, WALL STREET J. 
(Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-to-banks-shape-up-or-risk-breakup-1413847436. 
145 FRANKEL, supra note 144. 
146 Id. 
147 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 245 (4th ed. 2016). 
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system may be adapted to each level of the organization, instead of a conventional 
top down process. In a self-governing group, the governed have more power to 
determine the rules and decide how they will be enforced, increasing the likelihood 
of compliance.152 
 
4. Self-regulation is a democratic system in which free group members voluntarily limit their 
freedom. 
This type of limitation is internal and not imposed by the others; not by the 
government nor by any other governance system. Each and every member of the 
group is his or her own regulator.153 In fact, self-regulation is similar to ethical 
behavior. Each constituent of the group is not only a part of a group, whose 
members behave in a certain way, but they are also a member of the government that 
imposes the rules of behavior. In other words, in this system, the governed are also 
the governors. For example, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and 
the American Bar Association (ABA) are some of the most recognized self-regulated 
institutions. 
Self-regulation is not only sensible in theory, but also in practice, as can be 
seen in various examples. For instance, Israeli banks and their regulators resist 
softening banks’ strict fiduciary duties, even when pressured by other government 
departments.154 They choose to retain their customers’ trust over profit, even when 
risk-taking is promoted on another nationally desirable project.  
Another early adopter of the self-regulation model is a major financial group 
in Japan: Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation (MUTB). MUTB has been 
following a unique approach to promote trust by serving its diverse client portfolio 
with a heightened standard of care and loyalty. In this context, MUTB voluntarily 
adopted a set of corporate principles that consist of morality and trustworthiness, 
strong expertise and loyalty to customers before the Japanese Financial Services 
Agency has launched its fiduciary principles.155 Recognizing that a sound corporate 
culture is not built overnight, MUTB initiated training activities to instill an 
understanding of fiduciary principles among its employees, as well as the members of 
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154     Tamar Frankel, A Story of Three Bank-Regulatory Legal Systems: Contract, Financial Management 
Regulation, and Fiduciary Law, 1 U. BOLOGNA L. REV. 91, 104–05 (2016) (“Israel[i] banks hold their 
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155     In March 2017, the Japanese Financial Services Agency published seven principles for 
Customer-Oriented Business Conduct as an expression of its fundamental policy. The policy mainly 
requires financial institutions to formulate and publish their specific approaches to customer-oriented 
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Shinichi Takahashi et al., Insurance and Reinsurance in Japan: Overview (law stated as of Dec. 1, 2019), 
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the public. Aspiring to be recognized as a fiduciary by the society,156 MUTB 
institutionalized its trust-building efforts through the Center of Fiduciary Office and 
continued its pioneering role to contribute to public education by opening the first 
Trust Museum in Japan. This approach illustrates the interaction between culture and 
compliance. 
 
VI. PART SIX: THE FUTURE OF FIDUCIARY LAWS 
The impact of fiduciary law is likely to grow, as the issues it deals with are 
expanding. Inequality of knowledge and expertise exists. It is likely to continue, 
depending on the level of trust and reliance on experts and the extent to which 
society benefits from that trust.  
 
A. Culture may gain increasing importance in behavior and enforcement of the law. 
In a world where crossing borders is mundane. Cultural intelligence (CQ), an 
outsider’s seemingly natural ability to interpret unfamiliar and ambiguous gestures, is 
becoming more important.157 This ability is vital for international service providers, 
as well as the employees working together.158 Although the importance of CQ is 
gaining more recognition, most of the employees engaged in international business 
have little understanding about how culture is impacting their work.159 
Regardless of whether they are enforced by law, by social rules, or by cultural 
pressures, fiduciary rules are a condition to the long-term well-being of a human 
society. They induce cooperative relationships, which require justly rewarded truthful 
and reliable expert services by humans to other humans. One’s freedom does not 
include what fiduciary law prohibits. A society will be wealthier if its fiduciaries self-
enforce and follow fiduciary principles. The reverse is likely to be true as well. A 
society whose fiduciaries do not feel compelled to be trustworthy, will, in the long 
run, be the poorest. 
 
B. Trust relationships are becoming more crucial for success. 
Trust is not necessarily emotional, nor is trusting people foolishly blind. 
Recent studies show that trust might depend on many variables such as experience, 
memory, and the level of risk of entrusting.160 A breach of trust raises suspicion, 
which might eventually cause reluctance to rely on, or rejection of, expert services. 
Mistrust may also give rise to more rules of culture or law aimed at maintaining the 
offering of, and the reliance on, the expertise of others.  
Alternatively, those who suffered injuries of breach of trust may retaliate and 
withdraw from using expert services. This reaction is likely to impoverish mistrusting 
societies. In sum, whether experts or the government can revive general trust in 
experts may depend on efforts by the government, the experts, and their mistrusting, 
but needy, members of society. This year’s Edelman Trust Barometer—a global trust 
 
156 E-mail from Mitsubishi UFJ Glob. Custody (Nov. 1, 2018, 02:23 EST) (on file with author). 
157 P. Christopher Earley & Elaine Mosakowski, Cultural Intelligence, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 
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158 Id. 
159 E-mail from Mitsubishi UFJ Glob. Custody (Nov. 29, 2018, 07:22 EST) (on file with 
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and credibility survey—produced optimistic results for the experts (e.g., technical 
experts, academics, financial analysts, directors and CEOs) to regain credibility.161 
The rise of fiduciary law will depend on the success of trusted enterprises 
and societies, and not on those plagued by mistrust and suspicion. Societies that are 
strictly result-oriented but fail to regard the sustainability of successful outcomes 
pave the way for mistrusted people to succeed. These are the people who benefit 
from breach of trust. On the other hand, societies that impose specific laws that 
measure and specify the required level of trust in expert services are likely to be less 
successful than societies that impose general laws that require experts to create and 
follow a culture of expert’s identification with the people they serve. The test of 
trustworthiness is simple: fiduciary law should be based on one guiding test by a 
party that offers trusted fiduciary expert. Would I, the trusted person, like to be treated the 
way I treat those who trust me? If I do not, then I should not treat others that way; 
regardless of whether they can be blamed or whether they are greedy, foolish, or 
cruel. Besides, others’ misbehavior does not justify misbehavior. The test for each 
person is: am I abusing the trust put in me? Trustworthiness should be self-imposed, 
regardless of how others view behavior, including the law, the government, and the 
victims. I am my own judge and my own potential victim of my own activities.  
 
C. Given the intricate network of global trade, nations are likely to be more interdependent 
in the future. 
International trade in the early stages of globalization was mainly based on 
exchange of “dissimilar goods between dissimilar countries.”162 Later, it was 
understood that trade between countries with similar natural resources, products, 
culture, and institutions could also be a good idea.163 Most international trade 
theories recognize the comparative advantage and postulate that “all nations can gain 
from trade, if each specializes in producing what they are relatively more efficient at 
producing,” based on their strengths.164 According to this point of view, 
specialization allows countries to increase their profitability by reducing production 
costs through a focused approach on producing large quantities of specific 
products.165 In fact, fiduciary relationships are based on a similar rationale. 
On the other hand, similar-to-similar trade may cause or deepen 
interdependency. For instance, financial wellbeing of an automobile exporter may 
largely depend on the smooth delivery of raw materials and imported components. 
The sensitivity against irregularities becomes even more dramatic if the imported 
product or service is highly technical or specialized (e.g., cutting edge technology). 
Because building an infrastructure to produce specialized product and services is 
likely to be expensive, time consuming, and require acquisition of know-how, the 
trade good would no longer be competitive in international markets. 
 
161 EDELMAN INTELLIGENCE, EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2018), 
https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/201810/2018_Edelman_TrustBarometer_E
xecutive_Summary_Jan.pdf, (last visited Dec. 30, 2018). 
162 Paul Krugman, The Increasing Returns Revolution in Trade and Geography, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 561 
(2009). 
163 Id. 
164 Ortiz-Ospina et al., supra note 27. 
165 Id. 
            2020]                                TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW                                          41 
 
   
From an international politics perspective, cooperation among different 
countries is likely to pose a prisoner’s dilemma with problematic outcomes. If both 
parties have conflicting interests and wish to gain the best possible outcomes for 
themselves, it is difficult to verify the other party’s trustworthiness. They may or may 
not cooperate. Because cooperation works best when one believes that the opponent 
is also cooperating, equilibrium can be easily undermined by mistrust, leading to non-
cooperative behavior.166 Historically, mistrust among countries has resulted in wasted 
resources and missed opportunities.167 
There are cases in which nations guarantee self-limitation (i.e., promising the 
other party not to take advantage of the desired equilibrium) based on international 
law (i.e., by treaties and participation of international organizations). Their purpose is 
to overcome global issues, promote mutual interests, and sometimes to survive. 
However, international organizations often lack enforcement power or the ability to 
impose a binding international law.168 Besides, restoring the trust between countries 
with historical conflicts may take centuries. 
This article does not purport to offer a solution or discuss the role of 
international law in restoration of trust among nations. It does, however, emphasize 
the potential power of fiduciary law on inter-governmental relations. A fiduciary 
society nourished by a culture of self-limitation, trust, and honesty would bring 
consistency and predictability to its relations. Fiduciary societies would also arguably 
be less risky to cooperate with because self-limitation inherently requires an 
evaluation outside of short-term, selfish benefits. Furthermore, fiduciary 
governments’ legal duty to focus on the long-term benefits of its people would entail 
a clear alignment of interest in solving global issues.  
And as a first step, countries may cultivate trust at the institutional level, 
similar to that of corporations. Because “culture, more than rule books, determines 
how an organization behaves,”169 an internal culture of self-limitation, trust, and 
honesty, may be instilled in a society’s members and institutions through 
education.170 Further, unification of fiduciary law may help us to create a global 
culture and may be an important contributor to building trust amongst nations, 
creating shared values and reshaping our long-term future interactions. 
Finally, memories may die hard especially if they remind one of pain. 
Recovering from one breach of trust is harder than maintaining long-term trust. One 
breach may undermine years of trust. It is worth remembering this effect when 
planning such a breach as well. This is the power of fiduciary law. 
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